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CHILDREN'S SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OF AILMENTS 
RESUMEN 
J. Richard Eiser and Christine Eiser 
Department of Psychology 
University of Exeter 
En este trabajo se han obtenido categorizaciones de semejanza y diferencias 
entre distintos tipos de enfermedades y condiciones fisicas en 24 sujetos de 8 
afi.os de edad y 20 de 11 afi.os. A cada sujeto se le presentaba una secuencia de 
10 combinaciones de 3 enfermedades de un conjunto de 5 y tenian que identifi-
car dentro de cada triada los dos que fueran mas semejantes uno a otro y dife-
rentes del tercero; despues los sujetos daban las razones para su elecci6n. Se 
utilizaron dos conjuntos paralelos de 5 enfermedades, seleccionadas de tal mo-
do que representaran las mismas categorias convencionales. Los resultados in-
dicaron un consenso significativo dentro y entre los grupos de edad en juicios 
de la semejanza relativa de las diferentes categorias de enfermedades entre si. 
Este patron de juicios permaneci6 estable en Ios dos conjuntos paralelos. Los 
niiios con mas edad fueron capaces de verbalizar mas razones para sus juicios. 
Estas razones revelaron una diversidad de criterios, entre Ios cuales no predo-
minaron Ios antecedentes causales, aunque Ios niiios mayores Ios mencionaron 
mas frecuentemente. Se entiende que Ios resultados apoyan una perspectiva 
que incorpora esquemas cognitivos, que implica continuidad mas que disconti-
nuidad en el desarrollo cognitivo. 
Palabras clave: Enfermedad, esquemas, desarrollo cognitivo. 
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ABSTRACT 
Categorizations of similarity and dissimilarity between different types of 
illnesses and physical conditions were obtained from 24 8-year-olds and 20 11-
year-olds. Subjects were each presented with a sequence of ten combinations of 
three ailments from a set of five and had to identify the two within each triad 
that were most similar to each other and different from the third; they then pro-
vided (open-ended) reasons for their choice. Two parallel sets of five ailments 
were used, selected so as to represent the same conventional categories. Re-
sults indicated significant consensus within and across age-groups in judge-
ments of the relative similarity of different categories of ailments to each other. 
This pattern of judgements remained stable across the two parallel sets. Older 
children were able to verbalize more reasons for their judgements. These re-
asons revealed a variety of criteria, among which causal antecedents, although 
more frequently mentioned by older children, did not predominate. These fm-
dings are interpreted as supporting a cognitive schema approach, implying con-
tinuity rather than discontinuity in cognitive development. 
Key words: illness, schemata, cognitive development 
INTRODUCTION 
Children's understanding of health and illness has been the focus of a con-
siderable body of research, largely because of the implications for communica-
tion with those undergoing hospitalization or suffering from chronic disease, 
(Bibace & W alsh 1981, Eiser & Eiser 1987) and development of primary pre-
vention programmes (Altman & Revenson 1985). It is perhaps unfortunate that 
so much of the work has been embedded in a "stage" model of cognitive deve-
lopment resulting in the conclusion that explanations of illness need to be tar-
getted at a specific level. The belief that children's understanding of illness 
progress through a series of rigid stages takes no account of social factors or 
environmental influences. A number of studies have challenged the idea that 
childrens' beliefs about illness are stage dependent, and further suggest that un-
derstanding may be more sophisticated than previously thought ( Carey 1985; 
Eiser, Eiser & Jones 1990; Eiser, Eiser & Lang 1989; Siegal, Patty & Eiser 
1990). 
This approach is therefore subject to increasing criticism (Eiser 1989). 
Theoretically, there is no account of the processes whereby children shift from 
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one stage to another, or attempt to handle decalage within any specific stage 
(Levin, 1986). At best, previous fmdings provide an adequate descriptive ac-
count of children's verbalizations, but there is no real reason to interpret such 
verbalizations as dependent on explanations involving changing logical structu-
res, (Carey 1985). 
Methodologically, too, the work has a number of shortcomings. The style of 
interviewing is often unnatural and repetitive, lacking many of the pleasantries 
of normal conversation (Siegal, Waters & Dinwiddy 1988). Non-standardized 
questionnaires and inadequate (or non-existent) control groups characterize ot-
her studies (Burbach & Peterson 1986). Poor reliabilities have been reported in 
attempts to code childrens' verbalizations in accordance with Piagetian theory 
(Bird & Podmore 1990). Finally, with few exceptions, research has focused on 
the child's understanding of the cause of illnesses. Such an emphasis is particu-
larly inappropriate when the illness in question (such as cancer, asthma, or 
many other chronic conditions) do not have single, or even readily identifiable 
causes. 
It is therefore essential that children's understanding of illness is not limited 
to that of causal explanation, but that other dimensions which might charac-
terize beliefs are also considered. For example, in a study by Altman and Re-
venson ( 1985) involving children aged between 8 and 14 years, a factor analysis 
identified general worries about health and beliefs about susceptibility to illness 
as distinct from more 'causal' beliefs concerning health locus of control. Altman 
and Revenson argue that the emphasis in previous work on illness causation 
may limit its implications for aspects of health promotion. 
All this suggests that children may be organizing their knowledge of health 
and illness on the basis of a variety of criteria, not all of which are explicitly cau-
sal. It is therefore appropriate to look at children's. schemata and not merely at 
their attributions. As defmed by Cracker, Fiske and Taylor (1984, p. 197) 
'~ schema is an abstract or generic structure, stored in memory, that specifies the 
defining features and relevant attributes of some stimulus domain, and the inte"e-
lationships among those attributes". 
The concept of schemata is thus very similar to that of categories, in that it is 
assumed that individuals will categorize objects and events on the basis of parti-
cular kinds of similarities and differences. Furthermore, since a schema is a 
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representation of knowledge stored in memory in a generic form (rather than 
simply a derivation from an isolated set of experimentally presented stimuli), it 
is likely to be used relatively consistently across time and across contexts. In ot-
her words, it is a representation of generalizable knowledge in terms of which 
new experience will, as far as possible, be interpreted and assimilated. Increa-
sed experience can lead to elaboration of particular schemata so as to take ac-
count of more subtle distinctions and associations. Such elaboration will often 
be age-dependent, but not need not always be so. Quite young children can ha-
ve extremely sophisticated schematic representations of particular topics in 
which they have developed a special interest or enthusiasm (Chi & Koeske, 
1983). However, without a sharp discontinuity in experience (that is, something 
that fundamentally challenges the structure of a person's knowledge or beliefs), 
such elaboration can be integrated hierarchically into the existing schemata or 
categories. This has important implications for cognitive development, in that it 
implies continuity rather than discontinuity in the patterns of thought used by 
children {and adults) of different ages. This emphasis on continuity is quite dif-
ferent from much of the literature concerned with children's concepts of health 
and illness, where the influence of Piagetian psychology has been strong. A 
weakness of this approach is that it is assumed that the representation of know-
ledge is dependent more on a general stage of cognitive development and less 
on specific learning experiences. Much is therefore made of otherwise arbitrary 
age-points which are presumed to mark the boundaries between, for example, 
concrete and formal operations. 
Whatever the merits of such stage notions in other contexts, there is no con-
sistent support for such distinctions with regard to children's concepts of health 
and illness (Eiser 1989). In fact, Carey {1985) presents convincing evidence that 
beliefs change throughout the age range of 4-10 years. It is not necessary to un-
derstand these changes in terms of qualitative differences in operational thin-
king, but they can be represented in terms of a shift from an essentially naive 
psychology of human behaviour to a biologically based theory of disease. This 
implies that much may be gained from comparisons of children of various ages, 
and not simply from studying those at transitions from supposedly different sta-
ges. 
The present study therefore is an attempt to see if children from two age-
groups will recognize a limited number of conventional distinctions between 
different illnesses or physical conditions, to the point that they can use these as 
a basis for consistent categorization, and whether the pattern of discrimination 
applies to different exemplars of the same categories. We also were interested 
in the reasons (if any) that children would offer for their discriminations, and 
120 Revista de Psicologfa de la Salud, 4(1), 1992 
Journal of Health Psychology, 4(1), 1992 
Children's schematic representations of ailments 
particularly whether these would refer predominantly to causal antecedents 
Gustifying the bias of much previous work) or, as we anticipated, would include 
a variety of other criteria besides. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The sample consisted of 24 8-year-olds and 20 11-year-olds. Pilot work sug-
gested that the task was difficult for some children below 8 years of age. The 
age-groups therefore represent a younger group functioning within a psycholo-
gical theory of human behaviour and an older group just emerging with con-
cepts of disease derived from more biologically based theories according to 
Carey (1985). There were equal numbers of boys and girls in each group. The 
children came from a broad cross-section of social backgrounds and were of 
mixed abilities. Parents were informed about the study by letter. No parent ob-
jected to their child taking part, and all children in school in the appropriate 
age-range on the day of testing were included. 
Stimuli 
There were two parallel sets of stimuli, each consisting of the names of five 
ailments. These ailments were selected to represent five categories: (a) child-
hood contagious condition, (b) minor symptoms, (c) common infections, (d) se-
rious illness and (e) accidental injury. Thus, set A consisted of measles, 
head-ache, 'flu, heart-attack and burned hand; set B consisted of chicken-pox, 
tummy-ache, cold, cancer and broken leg. Each name was printed on a separate 
sheet of white card. Half the children in each group were shown examples from 
set A; the remainder from set B. 
Procedure 
Children were interviewed one at a time in the school music room. First they 
were asked if they had ever been in hospital and what it was .like. (These data 
were not analysed but were used to encourage the children to talk freely about 
their experiences.) They were then told that they were going to play a kind of 
game, which they probably already knew, where they would be given the names 
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of three things and asked to describe how two were alike and different from the 
third. Two examples were given: a house, a tree and a school; and a tree, a vio-
lin and a piano. None of the children had any difficulty with the task. They were 
shown sets of three cards (each showing the name of an ailment),and asked to 
select the "two that were most alike and different from the third". They were then 
asked to give a reason for their choice. Each child was asked to make ten res-
ponses so as to complete all possible combinations of three ailments from the 
set of five, with each illness appearing in six of the ten triads, with the ten triads 
presented in a random order. However, not all subjects were in fact able to ma-
ke a selection on all triads; if they failed to respond after gentle encouragement, 
the triad in question was passed over and the next one presented. Finally, chil-
dren were asked informally if they could think of the names of any other illnes-
ses and how they had mainly learned about illness. 
RESULTS 
The first issue considered was whether subjects showed any consistency in 
their judgements of which ailments were more or less similar to each other, and 
if so, whether the pattern of similarity judgements was comparable for the two 
sets of stimuli and for the two age groups. To this end, we first counted the 
number of times each subject chose each of the five stimuli (ailments) as the 
'odd one out' across the six triads in which it appeared. Thus, for each stimulus 
we derived a 'dissimilarity' score with a possible range from 0 to 6. Table 1 
shows the means of these scores for the two sets and for the two age-groups. 
These data were submitted to a repeated-measures MANOV A with two be-
tween-subjects factors (Set and Age) and one within-subjects factor (Ailment). 
This yielded a significant main effect for Set (F (1,40) = 35.14, p< .001), reflec-
ting the fact that scores were generally lower for set A than set B. This result 
may therefore be interpreted as showing that the triads generated from set B 
were generally easier or more discriminable than set A in that they produced 
fewer non-responses. (Separate univariate comparisons indicated that the diffe-
rence in dissimilarity scores was strongest in relation to the stimuli 'burned 
hand' and 'broken leg', (F (1,40) = 4.85, p < .05). The effects of Age and the Set 
x Age interaction were miniscule. The effect of Ailment, however, was highly 
significant (F (4,37) = 16.07, p< .001), showing that, across the two sets, the five 
types of ailment differed significantly in terms of dissimilarity from one another. 
Ailment did not interact with Set, Age or Set x Age (Fs < 1). 
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Table 1. Mean 'dissimilarity' scores for each ailment type as a function 
of Set and Age. 
Ailment:* a b c d e N 
Set: Age: 
8 years 1.31 0.92 1.15 2.46 2.08 13 
A 11 years 1.10 0.80 1.00 2.10 3.00 10 
Combined 1.22 0.87 1.09 2.30 2.48 23 
8 years 1.46 1.00 1.09 2.64 3.73 11 
B 11 years 1.80 0.90 1.60 2.30 3.30 10 
Combined 1.62 0.95 1.33 2.48 2.52 21 
8 years 1.38 0.96 1.13 2.54 2.83 24 
Combined 11 years 1.45 0.85 1.30 2.20 3.15 20 
Combined 1.41 0.91 1.21 2.39 2.98 44 
* Ailment types are (a) childhood contagious condition (b) minor symptoms (c) common infec-
tions (d) serious illness (e) accidental injuty 
Another way of considering these data is in terms of the rank order of the fi-
ve types of ailment in terms of dissimilarity. This order, from least to most dis-
criminable, was as follows: head-ache/tummy-ache, 'flu/cold, measles/chicken-
pox, heart-attack/cancer, burned hand/broken leg. For the total sample, Ken-
dall's coefficient of concordance W was .32 (Chi2 (4) = 56.24, p< .001), indica-
ting a high degree of inter-subject agreement in this rank ordering. The same 
ordering was shown for both sets considered separately (for Set A, W = .31, 
p < .001; Set B, W = .34, p < .001) indicating that subjects were discriminating 
consistently between categories of ailments. There was also high inter-subject 
agreement for both age groups considered separately (8 yrs, W = .35, p < .001; 
11 yrs, W = .30, p < .001). Since the rank ordering was the same for both age-
groups, this suggests that both younger and older subjects showed comparable 
recognition of such categories. 
We next considered the reasons given by subjects for their choices. The fo-
llowing coding scheme was developed and yielded complete agreement be-
tween two coders, with a few ambiguities resolved by discussion: 
o No reason: where a choice was made but no reason could be stated. 
o Incidence: criteria concerning who might suffer from the ailment, 
how rare or predictable it was. 
o Cause: causal antecedents of the ailment, such as own behaviour, 
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accident or infection. 
° Feelings: affective consequences such as pain or worry. 
o Symptoms: parts of the body affected, possible eo-occurrence of 
ailments. 
o Treatment: how, if at all, the ailments would be treated, such as by 
going to hospital, staying home from school. 
. o Effects: general distinctions in terms of seriousness, such as likeli-
hood of death or recovery, and physical consequences such as scars. 
The mean frequencies with which subjects responded within any of these ca-
tegories (as a function of set and age) are shown in Table 2. These figures com-
bine the data across all triads presented; if more than one category of reason 
was offered for any one triad, both responses were included in the frequencies, 
but a single category could only be counted once for a single triad. 
Table 2. Mean frequencies of different reasons, as a function of Set and Age 
Reason*: No a b c d e f Total 
Set: Age: 
8years 1.69 0.23 0.69 1.39 2.15 1.92 2.00 8.39 
A 11 years 2.50 0.20 1.70 1.60 3.30 0.90 2.10 9.80 
Combined 2.04 0.22 1.13 1.48 2.65 1.48 2.04 9.00 
8 years 2.91 0.00 0.55 0.36 2.55 1.36 2.36 7.18 
B 11 years 0.30 0.60 2.40 0.90 3.70 1.10 1.90 10.60 
Combined 1.67 0.29 1.43 0.62 3.10 1.24 2.14 8.81 
8 years 2.25 0.13 0.63 0.92 2.33 1.67 2.17 7.83 
Combined 11 years 1.40 0.40 2.05 1.25 3.50 1.00 2.00 10.20 
Combined 1.86 0.25 1.27 1.07 2.86 1.36 2.09 8.91 
*Reason are (a) incidence (b) cause (c) feelings (d) symptoms (e) treatment (f) effects 
These data (with the exclusion of the 'no reason' frequencies) were submit-
ted to a repeated measures MANOVA, with Set, Age and Reason (the six cate-
gories from 'incidence' to 'effects') as factors. This yielded a significant Age 
effect (F (1,40) = 8.92, p< .005), reflecting the fact that younger subjects gave 
fewer reasons when all categories were combined (means 7.83 vs. 10.20). Univa-
riate tests indicated that older subjects were more likely to use 'cause' than 
younger subjects (F (1,40) = 4.90, p < .05), but age differences in the use of ot-
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her categories, treated separately, were not significant. There was a strong main 
effect for Reason (F (5,36) = 23.58, p< .001), but no other main effect or inte-
raction approached significance. Importantly, the Age x Reason interaction 
yielded an F (5,36) of only 1.14 (p = .36), indicating little difference between 
the age groups in the relative frequency of use of different kinds of reason. The 
differences in frequencies of 'no reason' responses (separately analysed) sug-
gest a Set x Age interaction, but this was not significant (F (1,40) = 2.17, ns.). 
Another way of looking at these data is to ask whether the rank order of fre-
quency of mention of different types of reason was consistent across subjects. 
As may be seen in Table 3, there was significant agreement between subjects 
overall and within each set and age group separately, but the order of mean 
ranks was not identical across the different groups. 
Table 3. Mean ranked frequency of mention of different reasons 
Inci- Cause Feelings Symp- Treat- Effects Kendall's deuce toms ment w 
SetA 2.46 3.28 3.85 4.11 3.43 3.87 .14** 
SetB 2.62 3.71 3.21 4.36 3.26 3.83 .14* 
8years 2.58 3.33 3.67 4.02 3.40 4.00 .12* 
11 years 2.47 3.67 3.40 4.47 3.30 3.67 .15** 
Total 2.53 3.49 3.55 4.23 3.35 3.85 .13*** Saml!le 
Higher ranks represent more frequent mention *p < .05 * *p < .01 * * * p < .001 
Answers to the subsidiary questions on knowledge of different illnesses were 
not submitted to statistical analysis. Most children named between two and five 
additional illnesses. Although there was a bias at both ages towards the mention 
of childhood infections, a considerable variety of conditions was identified (one 
11-year-old girl named three equine diseases!). At both ages, children mentio-
ned their mother and television as their main sources of knowledge about 
illness. 
DISCUSSION 
These fmdings imply a reliable degree of consensus among our subjects in 
their conceptions of the relative similarities and dissimilarities between diffe-
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rent illnesses or physical conditions. The close parallel between the fmdings for 
the two stimulus sets suggest that these conceptions are based on judged rela-
tionships between categories, and are less dependent on the particular exem-
plars of the categories presented. These category relationships were judged in 
essentially the same way by our younger as by our older subjects, implying that, 
if there are developmental changes within this age-range in children's concep-
tions of illness, such changes are not a matter of increased recognition or discri-
mination of categories at this level of complexity. Nonetheless, it should be 
remembered that each subject only received one exemplar of each category. 
We cannot be sure that the same relationships would have emerged from judge-
ments of the two age-groups if several exemplars had been presented. 
Much previous work (Bibace & Walsh, 1981) has postulated major qualitati-
ve shifts in children's explanations of illness and has defmed conceptions of 
health and illness almost entirely in terms of such explanations. Our data indi-
cate that older subjects were more fluent in terms of the number of reasons they 
offered generally and in terms of the number of 'causal' explanations in particu-
lar (although it must be remembered that the Age x Reason interaction was 
nonsignificant). In other words, although the younger subjects made essentially 
the same discriminations between the illnesses as did the older subjects, they 
were rather less able to verbalize the reasons for their choice. On the one hand, 
this implies that older children may have developed more complex linguistic 
representations of particular category systems (without necessarily restructu-
ring the category system per se). On the other hand, it might be inferred that 
methods of assessment that rely heavily on linguistic response modes may unde-
restimate the discrimination abilities of younger children. 
Our data also warn against an emphasis on specifically causal explanations, 
as opposed to other criteria for discrimination. In broad terms, our subjects we-
re more inclined to categorize the different illnesses in terms of symptoms and 
consequences than in terms of ant~cedents. This is reminiscent of debates in 
the field of social cognition, where it is becoming increasingly accepted that a 
predominant reliance on models of causal attribution (explanation) may fail to 
account either for how individuals predict their environment, or for how such 
predictions shape behaviour (Eiser, 1986; Holland et al., 1986). Very simply, it 
may be just as important to know what will happen if you have an illness as to 
know why that illness has occurred. 
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